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Efficient Annuitization: Optimal Strategies for Hedging Mortality Risk
1 Introduction
Yaari [1965] theorized that individuals with access to actuarially fair annuities
and without a bequest motive would optimally annuitize all of their assets. Since this
publication, it has been an open puzzle as to why individuals rarely voluntarily choose to
annuitize much, if any, of their retirement assets. Recently, Davidoff, Brown and
Diamond [2005] extended the puzzle by pointing out that full annuitization did not
require all the axioms of expected utility maximization. Rather, since annuities
facilitated consumption at lower prices, all that was essential to the result was a lack of a
bequest motive and a preference for more over less.
Since the potential benefit for fully annuitizing is substantial1, a significant
amount of research over the ensuing decades has attempted to explain the lack of annuity
demand. In broad terms, the research fell into two categories. First, some researchers
focused on why the benefits to annuitization were smaller than originally envisioned.
Other researchers hypothesized that unaccounted-for costs associated with annuitization
dampened demand. (See Brown and Warshawsky [2004] for an excellent overview of
this literature.)
Two explanations have been proposed that relate to reduced benefits from
annuitization. First, some research has noted that many people already have a substantial
fraction of their wealth already annuitized in the form of promised pension benefits such
as Social Security or employer-based defined benefit plans. (See, for example, Brown

1

Baseline annuity benefits have been estimated to increase effective available wealth by 50% or more.
(See, for example, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown [1999].)
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and Poterba [2000], and Mitchell et al. [1999].) The benefits of additional annuitization
are decreased if substantial existing wealth is already annuitized. A second factor
reducing the benefits to annuitization is the ability of families to pool their mortality risk.
For example, Kotlikoff and Spivak [1981] demonstrate that a couple can capture close to
half the potential benefits associated with annuitization without actually purchasing any
annuities. While both of these factors could substantially reduce the expected benefits to
annuitization, they do not eliminate the benefit. Unless some costs associated with
annuitization are introduced, these explanations merely reduce the available gains
without altering the optimality of full annuitization.
Other authors tackle the annuity puzzle from the cost perspective. In Yaari’s
model, there are no downsides to annuitization. With only benefits and no costs, the
optimal answer is full annuitization. First, some authors have noted the original Yaari
work assumes actuarially fair annuity prices. If prices reflect insurance costs and the
potential for adverse selection, then depending on the pricing structure, full annuitization
may no longer be optimal (e.g., Friedman and Warshawsky [1988] and Mitchell, Poterba,
Warshawksy and Brown [1999]). Another critical assumption made in Yaari’s analysis
was the absence of bequest motives. However, every dollar spent on annuities implies
one less dollar available for a bequest. If individuals have a bequest motive, then full
annuitization may again no longer be optimal. For example, Walliser [1999] calculates
that, with reasonable assumptions for risk aversion and bequest motives, it is optimal to
annuitize only 60% of wealth at age 65.
Demand for liquidity creates another implicit cost consideration. If future
expenses are uncertain, then individuals would prefer to have a pool of liquid assets to
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insure against future needs. Since annuity purchases are largely irreversible, every dollar
spent on an annuity is one less dollar available for unknown future expenses. As an
example, some authors have pointed to expenses related to health uncertainty as a
potential detriment to annuity demand (e.g., Brown and Warshawsky [2004] or
Brugiavini [1993]).
Finally, a growing literature has focused on a market imperfection associated with
many annuity contracts in the United States. These annuity contracts are not indexed to
equity markets and thus preclude access to any available equity risk premium. Given this
restriction, individuals may wish to reduce their annuity holdings or perhaps eliminate
them altogether depending on their risk tolerance and the equity premium relative to
annuities (e.g., Kapur and Orszag [1999]; Stabile [2003]; Milevsky and Young [2003];
Dushi and Webb [2004]; Dus, Maurer and Mitchell [2005]; Kingston and Thorp [2005];
Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus [2006]; and Koijen, Nijman and Werker [2006]).
Similar to bequests and liquidity, every incremental dollar annuitized carries an
additional cost component. In this case, the cost stems from having one less dollar
available to invest in the equity markets.
Once costs are introduced, the fundamental problem of optimal annuitization
changes dramatically. First, since every dollar annuitized incurs additional costs, the
optimal level of annuitization is generally a fraction of total wealth. Second, costs imply
individuals are concerned with annuity efficiency. Annuity contracts that can deliver
larger benefits per dollar invested (i.e., are more efficient) are always more desirable
since they can provide equal benefits at lower costs compared to less efficient annuity
contracts. Surprisingly, while the literature has explored costs associated with annuity
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purchases, no research has been done on annuity efficiency. The almost universal
assumption has been that “buying an annuity” refers to purchasing an immediate annuity
whose payments begin immediately and are guaranteed for as long as the individual lives.
This paper demonstrates that annuity contracts differ greatly in their efficiency.
We first analyze optimal annuity purchases assuming access to flexible state-contingent
annuity contracts. Given this framework, we demonstrate that the optimal allocation of
annuity resources implies annuitized assets fund consumption late in retirement and nonannuitized assets fund consumption early in retirement. Since the optimal allocation of
wealth involves a separation between non-annuity and annuity-funded years, immediate
annuities are generally only optimal when costs are low enough to allow full
annuitization. The size of the inefficiency of immediate annuities is surprising. For a
typical example, we find that six percent of wealth efficiently allocated to statecontingent annuities can provide up to half of the available benefits from mortality risk
sharing. To receive a similar level of welfare, immediate annuities would require an
allocation of thirty-nine percent of wealth.
Unfortunately, state-contingent annuity contracts are a theoretical construct not
currently available in the insurance market. However, we demonstrate that recently
introduced delayed payout annuity contracts can provide all, or substantially all, of the
benefits associated with full access to state-contingent annuity contracts. Because
delayed payout annuities are much more efficient than immediate annuities, they should
be highly desirable to any individual facing annuitization costs from bequests, liquidity
concerns or asset allocation constraints. It will be interesting to see if these new annuity
products are successful in the market. Theoretically, they should be strongly preferred to
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traditional immediate annuities. Since they have the potential to provide a majority of the
annuity benefits with a modest five to ten percent annuity allocation, the usual cost-based
explanations for low annuity demand (bequest motives, liquidity concerns, or market
imperfections) are unlikely to apply to delayed payout annuities. A lack of market
success for delayed payout annuities would thus create a new annuity puzzle.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the canonical
problem of an individual entering retirement with a pool of wealth and an objective to
maximize lifecycle utility through the purchase of either bonds or annuities. Section 3
explores optimal consumption assuming individuals are unconstrained in their allowed
allocation of wealth to annuities and have access to flexible state-contingent annuities.
Section 4 introduces the concept of annuity costs and considers the problem of optimal
partial annuitization. Section 5 analyzes the efficiency of different annuity products at
delivering the benefits of mortality risk sharing. In addition to a baseline analysis, the
efficiency analysis considers two extensions. First, the situation where the annuity prices
are actuarially unfair is analyzed. Second, the case where Social Security is a large
fraction of total wealth is considered. Section 6 relates the current analysis to the existing
literature, and Section 7 concludes by summarizing the key findings including normative
suggestions for retirees struggling with longevity considerations.
2 Lifecycle Utility Problem Definition
Consider a retired individual that has an accumulated amount of wealth available
to support retirement consumption. This individual has two flavors of investment options
available. The first is zero coupon bonds. The prices for these zero coupon bonds are
given by Bt where:
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Bt =

price today for $1 payout in year t

Annuity products are also available. For this analysis, we consider a hypothetical
set of simple contingent claim annuities that pay out $1 t-periods into the future, provided
the individual is alive at that time. The price for each of these annuities is given by At
where:
At =

price today for $1 payout in year t, conditional on survival to period t

These types of annuities are sometimes referred to as “zero coupon” annuities due to their
similarity to zero coupon bonds or as “Arrow” annuities due to their state-dependent
payout structure. We will adopt the Arrow annuity terminology to refer to these
contingent claim securities.
For simplicity, assume our individual has no bequest motive and wishes to
allocate his wealth so as to maximize expected utility. We also assume at this point that
there is no inflation, so dollar payouts at any point in time are equivalent to consumption
units. Finally, assume that expected utility is additively separable in time, and is given by
the expression below:

(1a)

⎧∞
⎫
Ω = max ⎨∑ Π t ⋅ ∆ t ⋅ U (ct )⎬
⎩ t =0
⎭

In Eq.(1a), Πt is the probability that the individual is alive at period t (as perceived by the
individual planning at time 0), ∆t is the individual’s discount factor for utility at period t,
U is the undiscounted utility of consumption, assumed to have the same functional form
for all periods, and ct is the consumption at period t. We assume that the discount factors
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∆t and the probabilities Πt are less than or equal to one, with ∆0 = Π0 = 1, and are strictly
decreasing in t.
Let xt be the amount of consumption from bonds, and yt be the amount of
consumption from annuities. The total consumption at time t, ct, is given by:
(1b) ct = xt + y t .
Further, let VB equal the present value of all bonds purchased, and VA equal the present
value of all annuities purchased. We then have:
(1c)

∞

VB = ∑ Bt ⋅ xt ,
t =0
∞

(1d ) V A = ∑ At ⋅ y t .
t =0

The present value of all purchases must equal the individual’s current wealth, W0. This is
the budget constraint:
(1e) VB + V A = W0 ,
Equations (1) are a mathematical program, but the solutions are unbounded. The
economics of the situation are apparent from the prices of the bonds and annuities.
Whenever the cost of an annuity payout dollar in period t, At, does not equal the cost of a
bond payout dollar in period t, Bt, then there is an opportunity for an individual to achieve
infinite utility. For example, if Bt > At, then an individual could short sell Bt and purchase
At in infinite quantities to maximize utility. To eliminate this possibility, we rule out
short sales from the analysis: i.e.,
(1 f ) xt , y t ≥ 0.
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These appear to be reasonable assumptions. First, there is no market where an
individual can sell an arbitrary annuity, thus implying a non-negative yt. Second, we
would not expect a lender to allow borrowing at the bond rate using an annuity as
collateral.2
3 Unconstrained Optimal Consumption
Solving the mathematical programming problem described by Eqs(1) yields the
optimal consumption path ct. We can reduce the optimization to an algebraic problem by
writing down the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality (Bazaraa and Shetty
[1979]). Our results assume that the investor’s utility function U(c) is monotonically
increasing and concave with marginal utility approaching infinity as c approaches zero;
i.e., our investor is risk-averse. This assumption leads to paths for which there is positive
consumption in any period that the individual thinks they have a non-zero probability of
being alive. We also assume that U(c) is twice differentiable, and denote derivatives with
respect to consumption by a prime. Since U(c) is increasing and concave, we have U′(c)
> 0 and U″(c) < 0 for all c. It then follows that the function U′(c) has a unique inverse; we
will put this inverse function to good use to calculate optimal consumption paths.
Further, we will assume that annuity prices are such that they can be represented as a
monotonically decreasing function, Pt, multiplied by the contemporaneous bond price. Pt
is the pricing discount received for agreeing to the annuity contract and can be viewed as
the survivor function that prices the Arrow annuities. If this function equals the
individual survivor function, Πt, then the annuities are said to be ‘actuarially fair’. Later

2

Yaari [1965] and Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond [2005] make less restrictive assumptions about the
ability to borrow. Loosening this constraint needlessly complicates our analysis without changing the
fundamental implications when annuity purchases are constrained.
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we will argue that monotonically decreasing Pt is an extremely weak assumption on
annuity prices.
To summarize, the initial assumptions for optimization are as follows:
U(c)

Twice differentiable

U′(c) > 0

Monotonically increasing

U′(c)→∞ as c→0

Infinite marginal utility at zero consumption

U″(c) < 0

Concave

At = Pt·Bt

Annuity pricing structure

Pt < 1

Annuity price always a discount relative to bonds

Pt > Pt+1

Annuity discount function monotonically decreasing in time

Optimal consumption at period t is given by the formula:
(2a ) Π t ⋅ ∆ t ⋅ U ′(ct ) = min (Bt , At ) ⋅ U ′(c0 ).
The intuition for this equation is straightforward. The right hand side of the equation
corresponds to the utility cost of purchasing an incremental amount of consumption in
period t. The left hand side of the equation represents the marginal increase in utility
from extra consumption in period t. Optimality requires a consumption plan that equates
these two quantities.
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Given the assumed pricing structure for the Arrow annuities, At < Bt for all t ≥ 0.3
We recover the standard result that all consumption is funded by annuity purchases (xt =
0 and ct = yt). Eq. (2a) can be simplified to the following:
(2b)

U ′(ct )
P ⋅B
= t t .
U ′(c0 ) Π t ⋅ ∆ t

Since U′(c) has a well-defined inverse, we can always solve Eq.(2b) for the consumption
ct, given the initial consumption c0 and values for ∆. The value of c0 is then determined
by imposing the budget constraint. Eq. (2b) also illustrates the well-known result that
when annuity pricing is actuarially fair (Pt = Πt) and the bond interest rate equals the
future utility discount rate (Bt = ∆t), then consumption is constant across time.
4 Optimal Bond and Annuity Allocation with Limited Annuitization
The model described in the preceding section predicts full annuitization, because
annuities are a strictly cheaper way to fund consumption in every time period. However,
there are several opportunity costs associated with increasing levels of annuitization.
These include fewer dollars available for bequests, fewer dollars available to meet
unexpected liquidity demands, and more dollars in a restricted asset allocation required
by the annuity contract. These factors can each lead to partial annuitization, as a retiree
would trade off the marginal benefit of an extra annuity dollar against the foregone
opportunities that a liquid (but more expensive) bond investment could satisfy.

3

Assuming period zero corresponds to immediate consumption, then A0 = B0 = 1. However, this creates an
indifference between bond and annuity based consumption at period 0. We adopt the convention that A0 =
1-ε to break ties. This assumption is immaterial to the overall results, but has the advantage of retaining
optimality for 100% annuitization (as would be the case in continuous time models). In effect, period zero
consumption occurs in the very near future with an infinitesimal chance of death over that time period.
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Rather than pose a particular functional form for one of these sources of annuity
opportunity costs, we analyze the problem of optimal partial annuitization by introducing
the following constraint4:
(1g ) V A ≤ αW0 .
This constrained model’s first-order conditions involve a new tradeoff: the marginal
utility of an extra dollar of annuity-funded consumption is balanced against the marginal
cost imposed by the aggregate wealth constraint (VA + VB = W0) plus the marginal cost
of using one more dollar of the annuity budget constraint ( VA ≤ αW0 ). The annuity
budget constraint's shadow price (its Lagrange multiplier) can be interpreted as
representing the multiple sources of opportunity costs of annuitization discussed above.
Whatever the exact source of these opportunity costs, it is necessary that any optimal
solution for models that lead to partial annuitization use efficient allocations of annuities,
where “efficient” in this context means that the limited annuity dollars provide the most
expected utility.
We now turn to the problem of efficiently allocating annuity wealth to maximize
expected utility given an available annuity budget. Constraining the amount of annuities
that can be purchased forces the individual to split their wealth between bonds and
annuities. The central question becomes what annuities are purchased when annuity
dollars are scarce? To begin to answer that question, we first introduce the Bond Annuity Separation Theorem.
4.1 Bond - Annuity Separation Theorem:
4

Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond [2005] use a model with an equivalent constraint to describe the welfare
gain from allowing annuities, moving from α=0 to α=1.
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Claim: If the annuity discount function, Pt, decreases in time, then it is never
optimal for annuitized payouts to precede non-annuitized portfolio payouts.
Proof: First, assume an optimal solution exists that consists of purchasing bond
payouts for time t+n (xt+n > 0), n periods after an annuity payout (yt > 0). Next, construct
an alternative solution derived by:
a) Reducing the consumption of period t+n bonds by a small amount (ε)
b) Purchasing a similar amount of consumption in period t+n via annuities
c) Reducing the consumption of period t annuities by an amount that offsets
the purchase of annuities in (b) and keeps the aggregate allocation to
annuities constant.
d) Purchase enough consumption in period t via bonds to offset the reduction
in consumption from (c)
Denoting the alternate solution with an asterisk (*), the proposed alternate solution
deviates from the presumed optimum by the following trades:

(3a) xt*+ n = xt + n − ε
(3b)

y t*+ n = y t + n + ε

(3c)

y t* = y t − ε ⋅

At + n
At

(3d )

xt* = xt + ε ⋅

At + n
At
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To assess whether the alternate strategy described by (3a) – (3d) is feasible, we
must verify that none of the constraints are violated. First, the alternate complies with the
no short sales constraints since the only reductions occur for yt and xt+n, both of which are
positive by assumption. Since ε can be arbitrarily small, there exists an ε small enough
so the alternate strategy complies with the no short sales constraint. The next constraint
to verify is the cap on aggregate wealth allocated to annuities. The aggregate allocation
of wealth to annuities is unchanged from the assumed optimal solution and the proposed
alternate solution (an amount of annuity wealth equal to ε·At+n has been transferred from
period t to period t+n).
Finally, we need to examine the budget constraint to determine if the alternate
solution is feasible. Adding up the net costs of deviating from the presumed optimum
yields the following impact on the budget constraint:
Net Costs = ε·At+n / At · (Bt – At) - ε· (Bt+n – At+n)
It suffices to show the net costs are negative to demonstrate that the alternate solution has
higher expected utility than the assumed optimal solution. The alternate solution would
then be one that has equal consumption as the assumed optimal, but with positive wealth
available for additional consumption. The net costs are negative when:
(4a)

ε·At+n / At · (Bt – At) - ε· (Bt+n – At+n) < 0

(4b)

Î At+n / Bt+n < At / Bt

(4c)

Î Pt+n < Pt

Condition (4c) is exactly the condition posited in the theorem, thus the claim is proven.
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The separation theorem prohibits annuity-funded consumption from preceding
bond-funded consumption in optimal solutions. This result is extremely useful in
evaluating situations with constraints on the annuity allocation. All optimal plans have
consumption first funded by the purchase of bonds and then later consumption funded via
the purchase of annuities.5
The separation theorem relied upon the declining ratio of annuity to bond prices.
But how reasonable is this assumption? First, consider this assumption in the case of
actuarially fair annuity pricing. In this case, the ratio of annuity to bond prices is given
by:
(5)

Pt = At / Bt = Πt·Bt / Bt = Πt

Since survival probabilities are strictly decreasing over time, the separation theorem
holds given this pricing structure. A very weak condition for annuity prices would be the
assumption that At < Bt for all t. If this condition did not hold for a given t, then the bond
in that time period would in essence dominate the annuity. For equal or less money the
bond would provide the same consumption without requiring survival to collect.
Rearranging the terms in Eq (4c) indicates that the condition for separation is similar.
For arbitrary annuity pricing, the separation theorem requires:
(6)

At+n < At · ( Bt+n / Bt ) for all n

Eq (6) illustrates two different ways of purchasing consumption in period t+n.
The left-hand side of Eq (6) purchases consumption in period t+n using the t+n Arrow
annuity directly. The right-hand side of Eq (6) purchases t+n consumption by first
5

For the discrete model we analyze, there is the potential for bonds and annuities to fund consumption in a
unique transition year. The separation theorem still holds since prior to the transition year, bonds fund
consumption and afterward annuities fund consumption.
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purchasing a period t annuity and then investing the proceeds in the bond market between
t and t+n. The separation theorem requires that purchasing the annuity directly is the
cheaper alternative. Similar to the argument that At < Bt for all t, if Eq (6) does not hold
then the period t+n annuity is effectively dominated by a strategy that provides the same
or more consumption with a weaker requirement on individual survival. Thus, it strikes
the authors as very likely for Eq (6) to hold in any functioning annuity market.
We should note that while the prior discussion assumes that riskless bonds
underlie the annuity contract, the separation theorem extends to annuity contracts with
payouts contingent on stochastic market returns. As demonstrated in Appendix A, as
long as the annuity discount rate relative to the price of the underlying security is
declining, then it is never optimal to have annuity-based consumption precede the
consumption from the underlying security alone. It is the pricing and not the stochastic
nature of the returns that generates the result.
4.2 Constrained Annuitization and Optimal Consumption

We now return to the constrained optimization problem. The equation that
governs optimal consumption in the constrained case requires the introduction of an
additional Lagrange multiplier to account for the annuity constraint. In particular the
equation is:
A
(2a ' ) Π t ⋅ ∆ t ⋅ U ′(ct ) = min⎛⎜ Bt , t ⎞⎟ ⋅ U ′(c0 ).
λ⎠
⎝

The new Lagrange multiplier is λ. It takes a value of one for the unconstrained case.
However, for the constrained case, the value of λ is bounded between zero and one. For
a given value of λ, one can see how the separation theorem is maintained. Given Pt is
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decreasing in time and given λ between zero and one, bonds are initially purchased until
Pt = λ. After that point, annuities fund consumption.
In Section 5 we explore the efficiency with which various annuity bundles
provide benefits compared to full access to Arrow annuities. A consideration in the
efficiency analysis is how closely can the annuity bundle mimic the desired consumption
path optimally selected with Arrow annuities? As we will see, increasing or constant
annuity-based consumption paths will generally result in better performance for a given
annuity product space. When Arrow annuities are available, the time path for
consumption is defined by Eq. (2a ' ) . Rearranging terms yields:
⎛ U ′(c 0 ) ⎞ ⎛ Pt
(2b' ) U ′(ct ) = ⎜
⎟ ⋅ ⎜⎜
⎝ λ ⎠ ⎝ Πt

⎞ ⎛ Bt
⎟⎟ ⋅ ⎜⎜
⎠ ⎝ ∆t

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

This equation is valid over the consumption region funded by annuity purchases.6
Optimal allocations will equate the marginal utility of consumption in period t to the
product of the three terms in Eq. (2b' ) . If the product of these terms is increasing over
time, the consumption path will decrease due to the concavity of U. The first term is
simply a positive scalar. It does not influence whether annuity-funded consumption is
rising, falling or constant over time. The second term is the ratio of two discount factors.
The first discount factor, Pt, measures the discount received, relative to bonds, for
purchasing consumption via annuities. The second discount factor, Πt, represents the
individual discount factor for survival to period t. Actuarially fair annuity prices would
equate these two discount factors, eliminating this term from influencing the time path of
consumption. The third term is the ratio of the bond discount rate to the individual
6

For the bond-funded region, the Pt and λ terms drop from the above equation.
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discount rate for future utility. To summarize, for time periods where annuities fund
consumption,
⎛ P ⋅B
(7a) Annuity-funded consumption Î ct is a decreasing function of ⎜⎜ t t
⎝ Πt ⋅ ∆t

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

During the time frame where bonds are used to fund consumption (i.e. the early years),
min(Bt, At / λ) = Bt. During these years,
⎛ Bt
(7b) Bond-funded consumption Î ct is a decreasing function of ⎜⎜
⎝ Πt ⋅ ∆t

⎞
⎟⎟
⎠

We will refer back to these relationships when discussing whether a particular annuity
product space is capable of replicating the desired time path of consumption.
5 Efficiency Loss: What if Arrow Annuities are not Available?

The previous analysis hypothesized the existence of Arrow annuities, which
facilitated an arbitrary annuity-based consumption pattern. In reality, Arrow annuities
are not available for purchase. Instead, the only available annuity contracts are those that
involve bundles of Arrow annuities. The following analysis assesses the efficiency loss
associated with annuity bundling.
5.1 Annuity Product Spaces

We consider five different annuity product spaces that allow increasingly flexible
annuity-based consumption patterns. Throughout the analysis, we assume that annuity
bundles do not carry discounts or premiums relative to the cost of purchasing the given
pattern of annuity payouts via Arrow annuities.
Annuity Product Space #0: No Annuities / Bonds Only
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This is the most restrictive product space. No annuities are available for purchase
in any form. This optimization provides a helpful baseline to compare results from the
other situations. We follow the convention in the literature of reporting an “Annuity
Equivalent Wealth” or AEW. (See, for example, Brown and Warshawsky [2004], Brown
and Poterba [2000] or Brown, Mitchell and Poterba [1999] for additional background on
AEW.) Throughout this analysis, the AEW answers the question: “How much aggregate
wealth is required for an individual with no access to annuities to be indifferent to a
situation with $100 in wealth and the given (potentially constrained) access to
annuities?”7 To define AEW mathematically, let
Ωi(w,α) ≡ Max utility given wealth w, α percent annuities and product space i.

Then AEW is always defined by the following equation:
(8)

Ω0(AEW,0) = Ωi($100,α)

For example, suppose we are considering the case where a person has access to
Arrow annuities and they are willing to allocate 10% of their assets to annuities. Suppose
further that the reported AEW was $142. This would indicate that optimizing assuming
$100 in wealth, access to Arrow annuities and a 10% constraint on annuity purchases
provides the same expected utility as optimizing with $142 and no access to annuities.8
Annuity Product Space #1: Immediate Annuities

7

In general, the AEW is a function of wealth. However, in all situations where we report AEW, we also
assume CRRA utility. Given CRRA utility, the AEW ratio is wealth independent. We adopt a $100 wealth
level for ease of exposition.
8
The literature generally assumes the right hand side of Eq. (8) corresponds to full annuitization. Here, the
definition of AEW is modified to be consistent with our focus on partial annuitization.
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This is also a fairly limited annuity product space. There is only a single annuity
available for purchase. This annuity is a bundle of all the Arrow annuities and it pays $1
in all periods where the annuitant is alive. An immediate annuity is assumed to have the
following characteristics:
Payout structure = $1 payout in every year t, conditional on survival to period t
Price =

∞

∑A
t =0

t

Given this annuity product space, the only annuity-funded consumption pattern
available is constant consumption. To achieve any other consumption pattern requires
the use of bonds to fill in the differences between desired and annuity-funded
consumption.
Annuity Product Space #2: Delayed Purchase Annuities

Several authors have investigated the potential of delaying the purchase of an
immediate annuity. (See, for example, Kapur and Orszag [1999], Dushi and Webb
[2004], Milevsky and Young [2003], Dus, Maurer and Mitchell [2005] and Horneff,
Maurer, Mitchell, and Dus [2006] who also provide a nice summary of this literature.)
Our current framework imagines all decisions as occurring at time 0. To assess the
potential benefit from delaying the immediate annuity purchase, we introduce t different
annuity products that replicate the cost and consumption pattern achieved by delaying the
purchase of an annuity.
Before describing the payout and pricing structure for a delayed purchase annuity,
let us first consider the assumed pricing for a delayed purchase Arrow annuity. Suppose
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our retiree decides to invest in a bond for t periods and then purchases an Arrow annuity
that pays out in t+n periods. This strategy would net the retiree $1 in period t+n at a
price equal to Bt·(At+n / At).9 The period t delayed purchase annuity would then have the
following characteristics:
Payout structure = $1 payout in every year t+n, given survival to t+n, n ≥ 0.
⎛B
Price = ⎜⎜ t
⎝ At

⎞ ∞
⎟⎟ ⋅ ∑ At + n
⎠ n =0

If the desired annuity-funded consumption pattern is increasing in time, then these
annuities provide a more flexible product space to meet the demand.
Relative to immediate annuities, delayed purchase annuities could provide two
additional benefits. First, delayed purchase annuities can provide a more flexible
annuity-based consumption pattern. Second, they potentially provide a more efficient
way to allocate scarce annuity dollars. This is in contrast to the literature where the
equity risk premium generally plays the major role in driving the demand for delays. In
that literature, annuitizing assets precludes capturing the equity risk premium, so
generally investors delay some annuity purchases until the annuity premium provided by
mortality risk sharing equals the equity risk premium. Our focus is not how the
underlying assets are invested (e.g., bonds or stocks), but rather how the different annuity
contract structures are able to deliver efficient longevity protection to retirees unwilling
to fully annuitize.

9

This assumes that an Arrow annuity purchased at period t for payout at period t+n carries a price of At+n /
At. For example, actuarially fair annuity pricing and a flat term structure would conform to this
assumption. More generally, any static term structure between period t and t+n is allowable.
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Annuity Product Space #3: Delayed Payout Annuities

Potentially one of the most important innovations in the annuity product space is
the delayed payout annuity. In September 2004, MetLife introduced their Retirement
Income InsuranceSM product that was described in a press release as:
“an annuity that provides guaranteed lifetime income and is designed to
generate income starting at a later age, for example an individual’s
85th birthday, when other income sources may be running low.” [MetLife,
2004]
This product is essentially a bundle of Arrow annuities that start at a future date instead
of starting immediately.10 These products generate the same payout stream as a delayed
purchase annuity without the utility loss associated with bond investing prior to period t.
While Arrow annuities allow the option of arbitrary allocations to annuities over
time, the separation theorem implies optimal annuity allocations are zero until a certain
point in time and then support all consumption after that point in time. Given this
optimal path of Arrow annuity demand, it is feasible that delayed payout annuities could
provide all of the benefits of Arrow annuities even though they require bundled
purchases. In fact, as long as the period-by-period growth in desired annuity-funded
consumption exceeds the period-by-period growth in the payments from the delayed
payout annuity, then delayed payout annuities provide all the benefits of Arrow annuities.
We demonstrate this result more formally in Appendix B.

10

In March 2006, The Hartford Financial Services Group introduced a similar delayed payout annuity
product described as “a fixed payment annuity which guarantees lifetime income starting at a future point
and continuing for the rest of one's life, no matter how long that might be.”
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This annuity product space allows a delayed payout annuity indexed to each time
period t. The tth delayed payout annuity pays out starting t years in the future and
continuing until death. The period t delayed payout annuity would then have the
following characteristics:
Payout structure = $1 payout in every year t+n, given survival to t+n, n ≥ 0.
∞

Price =

∑A
n =0

t +n

Notice how this product provides the same payouts as the delayed purchase annuity, but
at a lower cost. Notice also, that if optimal consumption based on Arrow annuities is
non-decreasing, then these delayed payout annuities can provide identical consumption at
identical costs. It is in this sense that they can substitute for Arrow annuity availability.
Annuity Product Space #4: Arrow Annuities

This is the most flexible annuity product space considered. This annuity product
space contains the annuity building blocks and thus can replicate or improve on any of
the solutions based on the previous annuity product spaces.
The annuity product spaces are listed in order of increasing desirability. Each
subsequent annuity product space either allows more flexibility or provides equal
flexibility at a lower cost compared to the previous annuity product space. If AEWi
refers to the AEW achieved given annuity product space i is available, then for the above
annuity product spaces the following holds:
AEWi ≥ AEWj , i > j
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Appendix C details the additional optimization constraints required to solve the utility
maximization given access to the various annuity product spaces.
5.2 Efficiency Analysis: Baseline, Actuarially Unfair Pricing and Social Security

To facilitate an efficiency analysis of the various annuity product spaces, it is
necessary to make assumptions regarding the specific utility function and discounting
parameters relevant to our retiree. The first assumption concerns the utility function, and
is common across all of the cases investigated. In particular, we assume the utility
function for our retiree is the following power utility function:
1−γ

(9)

c
−1
U (c t ) = t
1− γ

Where gamma (γ) acts as the risk aversion parameter.
The second assumption we will make across all of the scenarios evaluated is that
the discount rate for future utility, ∆t, is just offset by the bond interest rate, Bt. In
addition, we assume that the annuity discount and bond interest rate is 3%. In other
words, we assume:
t

⎛ 1 ⎞
(10) ∆ t = Bt = ⎜
⎟ , for all t
⎝ 1.03 ⎠
We now turn our attention to the evaluation of efficiency losses associated with various
annuity product spaces in specific situations.
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Baseline Analysis:

As a baseline analysis, we will assume annuity prices are actuarially fair. That is,
we will assume that Pt = Πt.11 Given this assumption, we recover the standard result that
optimal annuity-based consumption is constant over time. This can be readily seen in Eq
(2b') where the marginal utility of consumption is constant over time. For the bondfunded years, optimal consumption is decreasing with time; decreasing survival
probability leads one to purchase less bond-based consumption in later periods, even
though the rate of time preference equals the bond rate of return. Evaluating (7b) with
the baseline assumptions implies that the bond-funded consumption time path is a
decreasing function of 1/Πt. Given a declining survival function, consumption during the
bond-funded years is also declining. For these assumptions, optimal consumption
decreases while it is funded by bonds and then stays constant once consumption is funded
by annuities. Only annuity product spaces that can replicate this optimal path of
declining bond-funded consumption followed by constant annuity-funded consumption
can potentially provide equivalent benefits to Arrow annuities.
How does our retiree benefit from the introduction of various annuity product
spaces? Figure 1 illustrates the AEW generated from allocating increasing amounts of
annuity dollars utilizing the various annuity product spaces. For this example, the retiree
is assumed to be male, age 65 with a risk aversion parameter (γ) equal to four. With
these assumptions, the unconstrained AEW is $154. Since the optimal unconstrained

11

Generally, the GAM-94 mortality table is assumed to price the annuities. In contrast to SSA tables,
GAM-94 caps mortality at 50% for the very aged. This cap creates implausible trends in the survival ratios
for GAM vs. SSA populations. To eliminate this peculiarity from the analysis, we universally adopt the
age 100+ mortality assumptions from the SSA with improvements from the SSA Actuarial Study #120.
Given the extremely low probability of survival to these ages, this assumption is immaterial to the results.
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consumption is constant over time, a retiree willing to invest all wealth in an annuity can
achieve the maximum AEW with any of the annuity product spaces.
Figure 1 illustrates most of the key concepts in our analysis. First, since optimal
annuity-based consumption is constant with Arrow annuities, delayed payout annuities
provide equivalent benefits as Arrow annuities. The ability of delayed payout annuities
to provide all or at least the vast majority of benefits achievable via Arrow annuities, the
theoretically ideal annuity product set, is a pervasive result in our analysis. A second
striking feature of Figure 1 is the inefficiency of immediate annuities. Delayed payout
and Arrow annuities provide significant mortality risk sharing benefits from the first few
dollars annuitized. Immediate annuities, in particular, and to a lesser extent delayed
purchase annuities require substantially more wealth allocated to annuities to generate
similar benefits.
Figure 1a explores the efficiency issue in more detail. Figure 1a reports
essentially the same data as Figure 1; however, the y-axis is normalized to range from 0%
($100 AEW) to 100% ($154 AEW). The y-axis now corresponds to the percentage of
potential annuity benefits delivered. Finally, Figure 1a only graphs the benefits
associated with the first 50% of wealth allocated to annuities. The efficiency differences
between the annuity product spaces are remarkable. Consider the amount of wealth
required to achieve 50% of the total benefit available from annuitization, which in this
case is about $27 in additional AEW. Arrow and delayed payout annuities require 6% of
wealth allocated to annuities to deliver half the benefits of annuitization. With delayed
purchase annuities, half the maximum benefit requires four times the allocation or 24% of
wealth. Immediate annuities are even less efficient. They require our retiree to tie up
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39% of wealth to achieve a similar level of benefits. A retiree who has a bequest motive
or is simply uncertain about his future liquidity demands may find it very hard to commit
almost 40% of their wealth to annuities. That same retiree may be willing to allocate 6%
to a delayed payout annuity since it is such a small fraction of existing wealth and it
generates a benefit equivalent to increasing consumption by 27%. If implicit costs such
as bequest motives, liquidity concerns, or a limited annuity investment universe are core
factors limiting annuity purchases, the advent of the delayed payout annuity could
significantly impact annuity desirability and improve retiree welfare.
Table 1 reports information for scenarios that differ with respect to risk aversion
and gender. In particular, data are reported for the following four scenarios:
Scenario #1: Male, 65, γ = 4, Figure 1 and Figure 1a Scenario
Scenario #2: Male, 65, γ = 2
Scenario #3: Male, 65, γ = 1
Scenario #4: Female, 65, γ = 4
For each scenario, results are reported assuming 5%, 10% and 20% of wealth are
allocated to annuities. For each level of annuity allocation, a number of statistics are
reported. First, the AEW for the various annuity product spaces is shown. Next, the age
at which Arrow payouts begin is reported. For Arrow annuities, all consumption after
this age is funded by annuities due to the separation theorem. The final two data
elements reported correspond to the percentage of total benefit achieved by the Arrow
annuity, and the level of immediate annuitization required to match the Arrow benefit.
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The general patterns reported in Figure 1 and 1a are apparent in the other
scenarios reported in Table 1. Arrow and delayed payout annuities are much more
efficient compared to immediate or delayed purchase annuities. The maximum AEW
benefit declines with decreasing levels of risk aversion. The maximum AEW assuming
log utility (γ equal to one) is $134 compared to $154 for γ equal to four. Scenario #4
considers a 65 year-old female with a γ parameter of four. This scenario highlights the
impact of increasing life expectancy. Compared to a similarly risk-tolerant 65 year-old
male, the female generates a lower AEW from access to annuity markets since lower
mortality implies lower benefits from annuitization, ceteris paribus.12 While the total
benefit is reduced for individuals with lower mortality rates, the efficiency provided by
Arrow annuities is increased. In this example, a five percent annuity allocation provides
47% of the total annuity benefit for the male, but 50% of the benefit for a female. In
addition, the female would need to allocate 38% of wealth to immediate annuities to
receive the same benefit, but the male would only need to allocate 36%.
Private Mortality Analysis

The analysis so far has assumed that the implied mortality table that the annuity
provider uses to price the annuities is the same as the mortality table used by the
individual to discount future utility, or in other words, annuity prices are actuarially fair.
However, it is impossible for an insurance company to offer an actuarially fair annuity to
everyone. Costs associated with offering annuities, capital requirements, and adverse
selection issues all result in annuity prices that are less favorable compared to actuarially
12

This may seem counter-intuitive: one might think that females have longer lives to insure, and thus
should benefit more from the availability of annuities. One way to understand how longevity affects
annuity demand is to consider an infinitely lived individual. Since survival is guaranteed, they would be
indifferent between bonds and annuities. They receive no benefits from annuitization.
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fair prices. This section analyzes the situation when the individual has private
information about their mortality. In particular, the individual is assumed to have
average life expectancy (represented by the Social Security population average mortality
tables), but the annuity prices are assumed to be based on above-average life expectancy
(represented by the Group Annuity Mortality or GAM tables). These two mortality tables
have fairly significant differences. For example, the median life expectancy using the
population average tables for a 65 year old male is a little above 17 years. Using the
GAM 94 mortality tables, the median life expectancy increases to just over 20 years.
Figures 1, 1a and Table 1 report the AEW benefit for access to the various annuity
product spaces assuming the same mortality table, GAM 94, is relevant for pricing and
utility discounting. Figures 2, 2a and Table 2 report similar information assuming the
individual discounts using population average mortality instead of GAM 94 mortality.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 2 illustrates the impact of changing from actuarially fair
pricing to private mortality inferior to pricing mortality. Before exploring the changes,
first consider what has not changed. Annuities are still the cheapest method for attaining
future consumption, thus full annuitization is still the optimal unconstrained solution. In
fact, annuity prices have not changed at all, so the annuity prices still satisfy the
requirements for the separation theorem.
However, several things have changed. First, Eq (2b) that governs optimal
annuity-funded consumption is now:
(2b' )

U ′(ct )
P ⋅B
P
= t t = t .
U ′(c0 ) Π t ⋅ ∆ t Π t
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Pt represents the pricing survival probability and Πt represents the private survival
probability used to discount future consumption. Even with the assumption that the bond
interest rate equals the individual discount rate, optimal annuity-funded consumption is
no longer constant. The improvement in annuity prices is no longer sufficient to offset
the discounting associated with survival. For the region funded by bonds, the
consumption time path is still a decreasing function of 1/Πt. For the region funded by
annuities, the time consumption time path is a decreasing function of Pt / Πt. Given the
mortality assumptions, Pt / Πt is always greater than one and is a decreasing function of t
until age 100. After 100, the mortality assumptions converge and the survival ratios
stabilize. The concavity of U thus implies optimal consumption is declining prior to age
100 and flat after age 100. Since optimal annuity-based consumption is decreasing given
access to Arrow annuities, none of the annuity bundles are substitutes for full access to
Arrow annuities even in the unconstrained case.
Turning to Figures 2, 2a and Table 2, the surprising result is just how little has
changed especially over the region where relatively small amounts of wealth are
annuitized. A reduction in life expectancy decreases the demand for future consumption.
Since the benefit of annuities is cheap access to future consumption, the maximum
annuity benefit has been reduced. While the maximum benefit has been reduced, the
efficiency of delayed payout and Arrow annuities is relatively unchanged. The maximum
benefit has been reduced from $154 to $149 for the baseline retiree. Figure 2 looks
remarkably similar to Figure 1 in terms of the relative efficiency of the various annuity
product spaces. As illustrated in Figure 2a, to get half the benefits available from
mortality risk sharing, a retiree would need to allocate 6% to Arrow or delayed payout
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annuities, 24% to delayed purchase annuities, or 36% to immediate annuities. Recall that
the analogous numbers for actuarially fair annuities were 6%, 24% and 39%,
respectively. Similar to the retiree facing actuarially fair pricing, a retiree with private
mortality rates markedly inferior to the pricing mortality can still garner a significant
improvement in AEW ($124.5) from a fairly modest amount spent on annuities (6% of
wealth). Essentially, the benefits from the first few dollars optimally spent on annuities
are so significant that even relatively poor pricing does not substantially impact the
desirability of annuitization.
A second striking feature of the private mortality analysis is the ability of delayed
payout annuities to deliver benefits comparable to Arrow annuities. With these
assumptions, optimal annuity-funded consumption declines until age 100 and then
flattens. However, delayed payout annuities are not able to deliver declining
consumption. Since delayed payout annuities can no longer replicate the optimal Arrow
solution, the AEW for delayed payout annuities will be lower than the Arrow annuity
AEW. While the AEW for delayed payout annuities is indeed lower, the degree of AEW
loss is immaterial as illustrated in Figures 2, 2a and Table 2.
To better understand this result, Figure 2b compares the optimal consumption
paths assuming a 20% allocation to either Arrow or delayed payout annuities. As
expected, the optimal consumption path when Arrow annuities are available is declining
while consumption is bond-funded, continues to decline after annuities start funding
consumption and finally levels off after age 100. Over ages where Arrow annuities fund
consumption, consumption declines from $5.81 to $5.03 representing about a 13.5%
reduction in consumption. The consumption time path with delayed payout annuities is
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different. During the bond-funded region, the payout is virtually identical to the Arrow
payout.13 However, during the annuity funded region, the solutions diverge. The Arrow
annuity solution continues to decline at a fairly similar rate to the bond-funded region.
The delayed payout annuity has a substantial decline during the first year fully funded by
the annuity, but is then required to be non-decreasing after that point. Examining the
relative AEW for each case; however, clearly makes the point that the two consumption
streams are very similar in terms of desirability. The AEW using Arrow annuities is
$136.20 while the AEW using delayed payout annuities is $136.12. For these
assumptions, access to cheap future consumption is much more important to delivering a
high AEW than the ability to match a given consumption path.
Social Security Analysis

Table 1 reports the benefits of annuitization assuming all wealth currently
available for investment is in either bonds or annuities. However, many individuals hold
a significant portion of their retirement wealth in the form of Social Security benefits.
Table 3 investigates the impact on the analysis of assuming 50% of wealth is already
invested in an immediate annuity.14 Having 50% of wealth pre-allocated to an immediate
annuity will clearly reduce the benefit of additional annuitization. However, the basic
result that Arrow and delayed payout annuities provide a significantly more efficient path
to annuity benefits still holds.

13

The delayed payout consumption is actually a fraction of a penny higher during the bond-funded years.
While the fraction of wealth held by pre-retirees in the form of Social Security varies by wealth level, the
median level is approximately 50% (Moore and Mitchell [2000]). Previous research focuses on a 50%
allocation as indicative of the Social Security scenario (see, for example, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky,
and Brown [1999]).

14
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For example, consider a 65 year-old male with a risk aversion parameter of four.
Full annuitization has an AEW of $154. A 50% allocation of wealth to Social Security,
which is modeled as an immediate annuity allocation, bestows a significant portion of the
potential annuity benefit. The AEW for half Social Security wealth is $133. Even in this
situation, the Arrow and delayed purchase annuities provide a very efficient method for
improving AEW with relatively small additional allocations to annuities. If this person
were to allocate an additional five percent of total wealth to Arrow annuities, the AEW
improves from $133 to $143, a $10 increase in AEW. To get the same improvement in
AEW from immediate annuities requires an incremental twenty percent of wealth
invested in annuities.
Another interesting comparison between Arrow and immediate annuities is to
consider the benefit from the first five percent allocated to annuities. From Table 1, the
first five percent allocated to Arrow annuities yields a benefit to this individual of $25 if
no wealth is previously allocated to immediate annuities. This amount drops to $10 if
half of the wealth is allocated to immediate annuities via Social Security. For immediate
annuities the comparable numbers are $4 and $3.5, respectively. Remarkably, allocating
an additional five percent to Arrow or delayed purchase annuities with a large amount of
Social Security wealth is still more than twice as efficient in generating AEW as
immediate annuities without any Social Security wealth.
6 Literature Review and Implications

Our analysis suggests that delayed payout annuities could substantially improve
retiree welfare. Importantly, virtually none of the annuity contracts analyzed in the
literature or sold to individuals involve delayed payouts. This disparity provides an
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opportunity to extend the literature and hopefully improve retiree welfare. While delayed
payout annuities are rare in the literature, we identify two papers that considered some
form of delayed payout annuities. Both papers offer hints at the desirability of delayed
payout annuities, but neither demonstrate or claim optimality for this form of annuity
contract. We start our literature discussion with these papers, and then comment on
implications of our analysis for related retirement literature.
Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell [2005] examine different phased withdrawal strategies
including withdrawal strategies mixed with life annuities. They examine how a number
of different withdrawal strategies perform on various non-utility based metrics such as
expected present value (EPV) of a spending shortfall, EPV of benefit payouts, and EPV
of bequests. Two of the annuitization strategies that are mixed with different withdrawal
strategies included a delayed purchase strategy (called a “switching strategy”) and a
delayed payout strategy (called an “immediate purchase deferral strategy”). The authors
note that “the deferred annuitization strategy is likely to be most attractive to those
seeking to secure consumption while alive, without completely stripping their heirs of
some unexpended funds.” However, the reasons for the desirability of delayed payout
are unclear. In fact, the authors indicate that “it is unclear what one might expect from
these switching strategies, in terms of risk and rewards.” Our analysis clarifies why the
delayed payout annuity compares favorably to the delayed purchase annuity in all of the
consumption and shortfall related measures.
Milevsky [2005] also considers an annuity product with delayed payout
characteristics. Milevsky’s paper “takes the approach that consumers will remain
reluctant to annuitize a large lump sum at retirement.” In terms of the annuity puzzle,
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Milevsky notes that “most people shun life annuities simply because they want to
maintain control of their assets.” The hypothesis for the main barrier to annuitization is
that a “sudden irreversible transaction will never be popular.” To help avoid the problem
of a large annuitization event at retirement, Milevsky proposes that “slow annuitization
over a very long period of time.” To achieve this goal, a new insurance product is
proposed that allows people to purchase future annuity payouts throughout their working
years. There are two main advantages to this new annuity product. First, purchases are
broken up into smaller transactions that occur over an individual’s entire working career.
Second, the price of securing a given annuity payout is extremely low. The low price
stems from the sizeable discount for dollars forty or more years in the future and the
potentially large mortality discount if payments begin at an age where survival is
unlikely. Unfortunately, many barriers were identified to making this product a reality.15
We agree with Milevsky that asset control and irreversibility of annuity contracts
likely play a large role in their lack of popularity. However, we would add one important
caveat. Sudden, irreversible transactions are only a problem when they are a large
fraction of wealth. If the transaction was a modest portion of total wealth then the
significance of irreversibility is greatly reduced. It is still possible for existing retirees to
attain a majority of annuity benefits with a modest allocation to a delayed payout annuity.
While purchasing delayed payout annuities during the pre-retirement years may have
some behavioral advantages, the benefit compared to a delayed payout annuity purchased
at retirement is relatively small due to the high probability of survival until retirement.
Spending a modest amount on a delayed payout annuity at retirement avoids the many
15

Some of the barriers included: regulatory barriers to annuity payouts that start more than 30 years after
purchase, lack of death benefit, and issues with inflation indexation for such a long horizon.
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regulatory and administrative barriers Milevsky identified with his proposal while still
maintaining the benefits of efficient annuitization.
In terms of the existing retirement literature, we identify three general classes of
research that can either be extended or better understood in light of the results of our
analysis. First, as identified in the introduction, there is a large and growing literature
that considers annuity contracts in the context of portfolio construction and retirement
consumption. This literature generally finds that delaying full annuitization is optimal.
A market imperfection, namely the inability to access equity markets within an annuity
contract, typically provides the fundamental incentive for partial annuitization.16 Since
this literature only considers immediate or delayed purchase annuities, expanding the
analysis to included delayed payout annuities should significantly alter the results.
Another area of pension research explores the optimal point to initiate a given
annuity payout. Our analysis also provides an intuition for the conclusions reached by
this literature. For example, Coile, Diamond, Gruber and Jousten [2002] examine the
question of the optimal delay in claiming the Social Security benefit. They find that
“delaying benefit claim for a period of time after retirement is optimal in a wide variety
of cases and that gains from delay may be significant.” A critical feature of the analysis
was the existence of non-annuitized wealth available to fund consumption prior to the
onset of Social Security benefits. Viewed through the lens of our results, the optimality
of delay becomes clearer. The Social Security benefit represents a fixed allocation to
annuities. By delaying the onset of benefits, the individual uses annuity wealth to fund
consumption later in life. Assuming non-annuity wealth is available to fund earlier
16

Annuity pricing could also provide an incentive to delay. If the structure of annuity prices was such that
costs exceed the mortality premium during the early periods, then delaying annuitization could be optimal.
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consumption, the delay is utility-enhancing because the result is a more efficient
allocation (i.e. more consistent with the Separation Theorem). Milevsky and Young
[2003] also investigate a situation where individuals have an option for delay and come to
similar conclusions with respect to the desirability of delaying the onset of payouts.
A third area of research closely related to the ‘optimal delay’ research is
concerned with the public policy question of forced annuitization of retirement assets (for
example, Milevsky and Young [2003] and Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell and Dus [2006]). If
delaying annuitization is utility enhancing, then forcing annuitization too early results in
utility loss. In essence, the authors are noting the utility loss associated with restricting
retirees to immediate annuities when delayed purchase annuities were available (i.e., the
loss associated with moving from annuity product space two to annuity product space
one). Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell and Dus estimate that a female retiree with moderate
risk aversion gains 11% of wealth with the option to delay annuitization compared to
forced annuitization at age 65. While delayed purchase annuitization can be utility
enhancing compared to immediate annuitization, additional benefits are available from
delayed payout annuitization.
Our analysis suggests a policy change that would eliminate the identified utility
loss associated with forced annuitization. Consider a policy that required assets of a
retiree at a certain age to be used to purchase an annuity. However, this policy would
allow the individual to select the date at which the annuity payouts begin. By providing
individuals access to delayed payout annuities, the augmented policy would eliminate the
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utility loss identified by the prior research and even provide utility gains for many retirees
relative to delaying the purchase of an immediate annuity.17
7 Conclusion

Since Yaari’s [1965] seminal paper, other studies have identified several reasons
(bequest motives, liquidity preferences, asset allocation constraints) why retirees may
rationally choose to annuitize less than their full wealth. These barriers to full
annuitization represent implicit costs to annuitization. Since these costs generally
increase with the amount annuitized, optimizing agents have a preference for efficient
annuities that deliver the maximum expected utility gain for a given annuity investment.
Using a standard lifecycle framework with flexible Arrow annuities as an
analytical device, we determine several new insights. First, any optimal allocation of
wealth between annuitized and non-annuitized assets involves a separation between nonannuity and annuity-funded consumption. Early consumption is based on non-annuitized
assets, while annuities fund later consumption. The separation theorem in turn has
implications for the relative efficiency of real-world annuity products. Because
immediate annuities’ constant payout streams violate the separation requirement, they are
quite inefficient relative to Arrow annuities. We show that a recent innovation in annuity
markets—delayed payout annuities—can effectively substitute for theoretical Arrow
annuities in many settings, enabling much larger welfare gains than are achieved with
similar allocations to immediate annuities. This ability of delayed payout annuities to
virtually “complete the annuity market” in an Arrow-Debreu sense is due to the fact that
delayed payout annuities obey the desired bond-annuity separation and allow typical
17

This result assumes actuarially fair translation between payout start dates.
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desired consumption streams to be matched. We further demonstrate that only small
fractions (5-10%) of wealth are required for delayed payout annuities to achieve the
majority of potential welfare gains from full annuitization. This stands in stark contrast
to the need to invest large wealth fractions in immediate annuities in order to achieve
similar welfare improvements.
Another potential obstacle to annuity markets is the impact of actuarially unfair
pricing, relative to individual mortality. We analyze a model in which the retiree has a
shorter life expectancy than implied by the pricing mortality table. These results show
that delayed payout annuities are still strongly desirable; retirees facing actuarially unfair
prices (relative to their own mortality probabilities) should not withdraw from the annuity
market. In this setting, delayed payout annuities still effectively substitute for Arrow
annuities, despite not being able to exactly replicate the desired consumption pattern.
Delayed payout annuities should realize higher demand than immediate annuities.
If they do not, then the explanation is unlikely to be found in theoretical models that
focus on implicit annuitization costs such as bequest motives, liquidity demands, or asset
allocation constraints. Individuals unwilling to consider full annuitization should find
delayed payout annuities a highly desirable way to get most of the annuity benefits
without tying up a large fraction of their wealth in an irreversible transaction. Since the
history of annuity markets has proven that most retirees are unwilling to annuitize large
portions of wealth, these findings are important additions to the normative prescriptions
of retirement economics.
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Figure 1
Annuity Equivalent Wealth by Annuity Product Space
Gamma = 4, Age = 65, Male
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Figure 1A
Efficiency Analysis of Annuity Product Spaces
Gamma = 4, Age = 65, Male
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Figure 2
Actuarially Unfair Annuity Pricing
Gamma = 4, Age = 65, Male
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Figure 2A
Efficiency Analysis with Actuarially Unfair Pricing
Gamma = 4, Age = 65, Male
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Figure 2b
20% Annuity Allocation
Delayed Payout vs. Arrow Consumption Profile
Male, Age 65, Gamma = 4, Actuarially Unfair Pricing
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Table 1
Baseline Analysis: Actuarially Fair Prices
Scenario #1

Scenario #2

Scenario #3

Scenario #4

Scenario Parameters
Age
Gender
Utility Gamma
2
Max AEW - Unconstrained Arrow Access

65
Male
4
$154

65
Male
2
$143

65
Male
1
$134

65
Female
4
$145

5% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$104
$111
$125
$125
88
47%
36%

$104
$107
$118
$118
87
41%
30%

$103
$105
$112
$112
86
35%
24%

$103
$110
$122
$122
90
50%
38%

10% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$108
$116
$132
$132
84
59%
47%

$107
$111
$123
$123
84
54%
41%

$106
$108
$116
$116
83
49%
35%

$107
$115
$128
$128
86
62%
50%

20% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$115
$124
$140
$140
80
74%
62%

$113
$118
$130
$130
80
70%
57%

$110
$113
$122
$122
80
66%
51%

$113
$122
$134
$134
82
76%
64%

1

1

A GAM 94 mortality table with 100+ mortality set to population average is utilitized for all calculations
Bond-only utility is normalized to $100 AEW

2
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Table 2
1

Actual Life Expectancy Below Annuity Pricing Life Expectancy
Scenario #1

Scenario #2

Scenario #3

Scenario #4

Scenario Parameters
Age
Gender
Utility Gamma
2
Max AEW - Unconstrained Arrow Access

65
Male
4
$149

65
Male
2
$137

65
Male
1
$126

65
Female
4
$141

5% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$104
$110
$123
$123
87
47%
33%

$104
$106
$115
$115
86
41%
26%

$103
$104
$109
$109
85
35%
20%

$103
$109
$121
$121
89
50%
36%

10% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$108
$115
$129
$129
84
59%
44%

$107
$110
$120
$120
83
54%
37%

$105
$107
$113
$113
82
49%
30%

$107
$114
$126
$126
86
62%
47%

20% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$115
$123
$136
$136
80
74%
59%

$112
$116
$126
$126
79
70%
52%

$109
$110
$117
$118
78
67%
45%

$112
$121
$131
$131
82
76%
61%

1

Prcing based on modified GAM 94 mortality table. Individual mortality based on Social Security population average mortality.
Bond-only utility is normalized to $100 AEW

2
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Table 3
Social Security Analysis: Baseline + 50% Preallocated to Immediate Annuity
Scenario #1

Scenario #2

Scenario #3

Scenario #4

Scenario Parameters1
Age
Gender
Utility Gamma
Base AEW - 50% Preallocated to Immediate
2
Max AEW - Unconstrained Arrow Access

65
Male
4
$133
$154

65
Male
2
$127
$143

65
Male
1
$122
$134

65
Female
4
$128
$145

5% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$136
$137
$143
$143
84
49%
20%

$129
$130
$134
$134
83
42%
16%

$123
$124
$126
$126
82
35%
13%

$130
$132
$136
$136
86
51%
21%

10% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$139
$140
$147
$147
80
66%
28%

$131
$132
$137
$137
80
61%
25%

$125
$125
$128
$128
79
55%
22%

$132
$134
$139
$139
82
69%
29%

20% Annuity Allocation
Immediate AEW
Delayed Purchase AEW
Delayed Payout AEW
Arrow AEW
Age Arrow Payouts Begin
Percent of Max Achieved with Arrow
Immediate Allocation to Equal Arrow AEW

$143
$145
$151
$151
75
85%
38%

$135
$136
$140
$140
75
82%
36%

$128
$128
$131
$131
74
79%
34%

$136
$138
$142
$142
76
87%
39%

1
2

A GAM 94 mortality table with 100+ mortality set to population average is utilitized for all calculations
Bond-only utility is normalized to $100 AEW
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Appendix A: Separation Theorem with Stochastic Returns

The text derived a separation theorem assuming the availability of two types of
assets, riskless zero coupon bonds, and Arrow annuities which were analogous annuitized
assets. In this appendix, we extend the separation theorem to securities with stochastic
payouts. The separation theorem does not require riskless securities. The main
requirements are the existence of analogous securities that are available in either their
normal form or in annuitized (i.e. survival contingent) form. As long as the pricing
discount available for the annuitized asset becomes more favorable with horizon, the
separation theorem will generally hold.
To demonstrate this result, first consider an investment, S, that has a current $1
price, but has stochastic future values. Let St, refer to the potential values that portfolio S
can take at time t. Now imagine a security that is analogous to our zero coupon bond, but
instead delivers the payouts associated with investment S at time t. To retain the notation
from the main text, we will use Bt to refer to the price of this security. The only change is
that now the payouts are stochastic. In particular, let
Bt

=

Price today required to secure payouts St at time t.

Notice, that all of these securities can be replicated through an investment in S, so all of
the prices must be $1. In other words,
Bt

=

$1, for all t

In addition to the investment S, our retiree has the ability to purchase Arrow annuities
with payouts determined by the performance of portfolio S. In particular:
At

=

Price today of security which pays out St given survival to t.
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=

Annuity discount × Price of security which pays out St

=

Pt ×$1

Similar to the problem described in the main text, our retiree can purchase either
the payouts associated with portfolio S directly or they can purchase the annuitized
version of those payouts. Let:
xt

=

Amount of dollars allocated to purchase payouts from Bt.

yt

=

Amount of dollars allocated to purchase payouts from At.

As long as the annuity discount function, Pt, decreases in t, then the separation theorem
holds. The proof follows the same approach as the riskless security proof.
Claim: If the annuity discount function, Pt, decreases in time, then it is never
optimal for annuitized payouts to precede non-annuitized portfolio payouts.
Proof: First, assume an optimal solution exists that consists of purchasing
portfolio payouts at time t+n (xt+n > 0), n periods after an annuity purchase (yt > 0).
Next, construct an alternative solution, denoted with an asterisk (*), that deviates from
the presumed optimal by the following trades:
(3a ′) x t*+ n = x t + n − ε
(3b ′)

y t*+ n = y t + n + ε

(3c ′)

y t* = y t − ε ⋅

At + n
At

(3d ′) x t* = x t + ε ⋅

At + n
At
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Similar arguments to those made in the main text imply the proposed alternate
solution is feasible given the constraints. To complete the proof, we must assess the cost
of implementing the alternate solution. For this problem we have
Net Costs = ε·Pt+n / Pt · (1 – Pt) - ε· (1 – Pt+n)
The net costs are negative when:
ε·Pt+n/ Pt · (1 – Pt) - ε· (1 – Pt+n) < 0
Î Pt+n · (1 – Pt) < (1 – Pt+n) · Pt
Î Pt+n < Pt

This inequality is satisfied by assumption, thus completing the proof. Independent of the
stochastic nature of the payouts, if there are securities that can be purchased in annuitized
or non-annuitized form, an efficient allocation will require purchasing the longer-horizon
annuities first. The only general requirement for this result is that the annuity pricing
discount relative to the non-annuitized asset improves with horizon.
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Appendix B: Conditions when Delayed Payout Substitutes for Arrow Annuities

Suppose the optimal Arrow annuity demand over time has the following form:
Y = {0 0 … 0 yt yt+1 … yT}
The tth element in the annuity demand vector, Y, corresponds to the amount of
consumption in period t funded by annuities. Note, the annuity demand vector is
compliant with the separation theorem. Further, define the growth in annuity demand, gt,
as follows:
yt+1 = gt+1 · yt, for all t such that yt >0
The question now becomes under what conditions can delayed payout annuities
(DPAs) exactly fulfill the desired annuity-supported consumption. To assess this, we
first define what is meant by a DPA in terms of consumption payouts. A delayed payout
annuity that begins payments at time t, Zt, has the following payout structure:
Zt = {0 0 … 0 zt zt+1 … zT}
We will let the first payment correspond to one unit of consumption without loss of
generality. Thus, the payout vector looks like this:
Zt = {0 0 … 0 1 zt+1 … zT}
Analogous to annuity demand, we define a payout growth rate, ht, that captures the
growth in DPA payouts over time.
zt+1 = ht+1 · zt, for all t such that zt >0
We make two additional assumptions before deriving conditions under which
DPAs substitute for Arrow annuities. First, we assume that a given DPA is priced

54

consistent with the Arrow annuity prices. That is, a DPA that provides consumption
starting at age 80 costs the same as funding that same pattern of consumption using
Arrow annuities starting at age 80. Second, we assume that over a given period of time,
the growth in DPA payouts is consistent across all DPAs independent of the start date of
payouts. In other words, ht is the same for all DPAs with payment start dates prior to t.
With this collection of notation and assumptions, we can now evaluate whether
DPAs can replicate the optimal Arrow annuity demand. To assess this, we examine the
period-by-period annuity demand. Suppose annuity demand begins in period t, then we
would need to purchase enough Zt to satisfy this annuity demand. Since the first payment
from a DPA is one unit, we need to purchase yt units of the DPA with payments starting
at period t. This DPA provides the following consumption stream:
yt units of Zt = {0 0 … 0 yt ytzt+1 … ytzT}
Next we evaluate the annuity demand in period t+1. The aggregate annuity demand for
period t+1 is yt+1. Part of this annuity demand is fulfilled by the period t DPA. The
remainder must be satisfied by a purchase of a period t+1 DPA. More precisely:
Demand for Zt+1 = yt+1 - ytzt+1 = gt+1yt – ht+1yt = (gt+1– ht+1) · yt
Assuming individuals cannot short DPAs, then replicating consumption in period t+1
requires the growth rate in annuity demand, gt+1 to equal or exceed the growth rate in
DPA payouts, ht+1. Now that demand for period t and t+1 DPAs are determined, we can
investigate demand for period t+2 DPAs.
Demand for Zt+2 = yt+2 - ht+2yt+1 = gt+2yt+1 – ht+2yt+1 = (gt+2– ht+2) · yt+1
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The same condition holds for the t+2 growth rates that held for t+1 growth rates, namely
annuity demand growth (i.e. consumption growth) must exceed DPA payment growth. A
similar calculation for other time periods confirms the general result. A DPA market can
perfectly substitute for an Arrow annuity market if:
(9)

gt ≥ ht for all t such that yt-1 > 0

In other words, as long as consumption growth exceeds DPA payout growth during the
time period when annuities are demanded, then an investor can replicate the Arrow
annuity consumption with DPA annuity consumption.
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Appendix C: Optimization with Alternative Annuity Product Spaces

In this appendix, we describe the mathematical problem for each of the annuity
product spaces described in Section 5. In each case, the availability of specific annuity
“bundles” requires further constraints on the problem. With some algebraic
manipulation, we show that the optimization for each of the various annuity product
spaces reduces to the baseline Arrow optimization problem with the addition of a single
constraint. For ease of understanding, we start with the least constrained problem (Arrow
annuities) and progress toward the most constrained problem (bonds and immediate
annuities only). Each successive case can be seen as a more restrictive version of the
preceding case (either having more restrictive constraints or subject to worse annuity
pricing), so that the maximum obtainable utility must be non-increasing.
Annuity Product Space #4: Arrow Annuities

The objective function remains
∞

max ∑ Π t ∆ tU ( ct )
t =0

with the constraints
c t = xt + yt
∞

( 1 − α )W0 = ∑ Bt xt
t =0

∞

αW0 = ∑ At yt
t =0

xt≥0, yt≥0
In the case where α=1 (full annuitization is allowed), the optimal consumption profile for
a CRRA utility function, U(c) = c1-γ/(1-γ), is given by
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ct = y t =

Wo ( Π t ∆ t / At )1 / γ
∞

∑ A (Π ∆
s =0

s

s

s

/ As )1 / γ

In the case where α=0, all money is invested in bonds and optimal consumption for the
same CRRA utility function is given by

c t = xt =

Wo ( Π t ∆ t / Bt )1 / γ
∞

∑ B (Π ∆
s =0

s

s

s

/ Bs )1 / γ

Annuity Product Space #3: Delayed Payout Annuities and Bonds

Again we have the objective function
∞

max ∑ Π t ∆ tU ( ct )
t =0

but we modify the constraints to the following:

ct = xt + yt
t

yt = ∑ z s
s =0

∞

( 1 − α )W0 = ∑ Bt xt
t =0

∞

αW0 = ∑ Dt z t
t =0

xt≥0, zt≥0
Note that zt is the amount of income purchased from a delayed payout annuity that starts
payments at time t. The total consumption from all annuities at time t is then the sum of
income from all prior annuity purchases.
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A delayed payout annuity that pays $1 starting at time t and every year thereafter,
provided the individual is alive, has a cost Dt. Assuming that this annuity bundle is
priced as the sum of its constituent Arrow annuities, we have
∞

Dt = ∑ As
s =t

One can show the following equality using summation by parts:
∞

∞

t =0

t =0

αW0 = ∑ Dt z t =∑ ( Dt − Dt +1 ) y t

Combining the above equations, we have
∞

αW0 = ∑ At yt
t =0

which is the same annuity wealth constraint as for Arrow annuities.
Furthermore, we can enforce the conditions zt≥0 by imposing the following constraints on
yt:
0 ≤ yo ≤ y1 ≤ y2 ≤ … ≤ yt ≤ …
Thus, the mathematical program for this annuity product space is the same as for Arrow
annuities, but with the added condition that the annuity consumption path must be nondecreasing. Maximum utility for delayed payout annuities is bounded by maximum
utility for Arrow annuities, with equality whenever optimal Arrow annuity-based
consumption is non-decreasing through time.
Annuity Product Space #2: Delayed Purchase Annuities and Bonds

This problem has the same formulation as annuity product space #3, but with the annuity
cost given by
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Dt =

Bt
At

∞

∑A
s =t

s

Note that this pricing is always inferior to the pricing of delayed payout annuities because
Bt>At for t>0.
Annuity Product Space #1: Immediate Annuities and Bonds

With the choice of only immediate annuities beginning at time 0, we have the same
objective function
∞

max ∑ Π t ∆ tU ( ct )
t =0

with the constraints:
ct = xt + yt
yt = z 0
∞

( 1 − α )W0 = ∑ Bt xt
t =0

αW0 = D0 z 0
xt≥0, z0≥0
Again assuming that the cost of the immediate annuity is equal to the sum of the cost of
the constituent Arrow annuities, we have
∞

D0 = ∑ At
t =0

This annuity product space can be viewed as a subset of annuity product space #3
(delayed payout annuities), with the added restriction that
0 = z1 = z2 = … = zt = …
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Alternatively, one can view this problem as a special case of annuity product space #4
with the additional restriction that
y0 = y1 = y2 = … = yt = …
Future Trading

For all optimizations, it should be noted that decisions are assumed to occur at
time zero and are not revisited as time passes. In many situations, future trading would
not occur even if allowed. For example, consider the baseline problem with Arrow
annuity availability (i.e. Annuity Product Space #4). At the two extremes for allowable
annuity purchases, α = 0 and α = 1, allowing future trading is unnecessary since the
original strategy is still optimal at any future point in time assuming the relative discount
and interest rates between period t and t+n are unchanged as time advances.18 When
annuity purchases are allowed but constrained, 0 < α < 1, future trading is also
unnecessary provided the implied period t allocation to annuities is consistent with the
allowable allocation to annuities. However, a given strategy involving delayed payout
and delayed purchase annuities may not in general be optimal when viewed from a later
time period. As such, the potential exists for improved welfare stemming from future
trading. Assessing the situations where large welfare improvements are available from
future trading is the subject of future research.

18

This can be verified by confirming that the original plan still satisfies the first order conditions at all
future dates.
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